

Estimated loss of preference for selected SVEs


	Estimated Loss of exports due to Preference erosion (million US\$)	Loss of exports as % merchandise exports
St Vincent & the Grenadines	22	57.7
St Lucia	30.5	42.2
Dominica	14.6	35.2
Sao Tome and Principe	1.1	28.8
Belize	32.7	12.3
Guyana	69.3	11.8
Mauritius	205.6	8.8
Fiji	55.5	8.2
St Kitts and Nevis	3	7.6
Vanuatu	1.9	5.2
Cape Verde	0.9	4.3
Jamaica	80.5	4.3
Barbados	18.4	4.2

Adjustment support for loss of trade preferences could be vital for SVEs.

Trade Adjustment costs in LDCs


Most Exposed to Preference Loss: Prospective Export Falls from Preference Erosion


Agricultural products		Non-Agricultural products	
Country	% loss	Country	% loss
Malawi	-8.4	Lesotho	-12.2
Mozambique	-6.2	Madagascar	-5.0
Tanzania	-4.8	Senegal	-4.9
Congo, DR	-3.4	Guinea-Bissau	-3.2
Gambia	-2.8	Maldives	-2.5
Senegal	-2.8	Mozambique	-2.5
Angola	-2.6	Mauritania	-2.3
Zambia	-2.4	Gambia	-1.8
Mauritania	-1.6	Uganda	-1.0
Uganda	-1.1		
Niger	-1.1		
Тодо	-1.0		



Studying the effectiveness of AfT

- Two approaches case specific and overall
 WTO/OECD case stories useful insights
 - > Overall effectiveness (mostly rely on quantitative methods)
- The aid effectiveness literature is vast and complex with mixed evidence but not many empirical studies on AfT.
- Commonwealth Secretariat sponsored several empirical studies
- A theoretically consistent empirical framework to link AfT to export performance and other indicators, Controlling for other relevant factors
- Use of time series data across countries (panel data)
- Estimations are carried out for SVEs and SSA





Global Value Chains and AfT

Findings from Banga (2013) UNCTAD, and also in Commonwealth THT

- Under GVCs, increased X are no longer closely linked to higher VA
- LDCs are either 'locked-in' at bottom of GVCs or 'locked-out'
- Distribution of gains is biased towards upper end of GVCs, dominated by mostly developed countries with competitive advantage in services like designing, branding, marketing, etc
- AfT needs to be shifted away from merely increasing trade and reducing trading costs to enhancing the competitiveness of the countries so that they can gain in <u>'net value-added'</u> terms.
- AfT needs to focus more on developing capacities rather than '*import* facilitation'

	Manufacturing exports as a share of exports of goods and services (%)			Manufacturing value added (% of GDP)		
	1980-89	1990-99	2000-11	1980-89	1990-99	2000-11
China	30	80	82	36	33	32
Brazil	41	47	42	33	20	17
India	45	57	44	16	16	15
Mexico	26	64	74	23	21	19
Korea, Rep.	82	79	77	28	27	28
Philippines	18	46	72	25	24	23

Source: Rashmi Banga (2013), *Global Value Chains: What Role for Aid for Trade? Commonwealth Trade Hot Topics*, issue 100, Commonwealth Secretariat, London

The Issue of Additionality

- Stiglitz argues that the increased flows of AfT cannot be called additional (as the original ODA commitment of 0.7% GNI is not fulfilled by developed countries.
- He argues, AfT financing may be skewed towards the preferences of donors. If this is the case, then "without additionality, aid for trade is just another form of conditionality".
 - Stiglitz, J. and Charlton, A. (2013), *The Right to Trade: A Rethinking of the Aid for Trade Agenda*, Commonwealth Secretariat, London

Issues for Bali

- How to ensure additionality of AfT?
- Increasing trade-related adjustment support (also how to operationalize it?)
- Supporting value chains to suit LDC interests (also more AfT for services development)
- Perceptions of AfT: Donors versus recipient countries
- Monitoring of AfT remains donor driven
- AfT flows from EMEs are not captured
- Local database for monitoring AfT

